

Moral Principles for Resolving Group Conflicts: Inspired by the Debate on Righteousness and Profit

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ABSTRACT

A series of severe problems including climate change, resource depletion, and overpopulation has been going on over the world. Almost all of these problems can be attributed to and explained by two kinds of moral conflicts—intragroup conflict and intergroup conflict. The traditional Chinese philosophy "yilizhibian" (The debate on righteousness and profit) provides helpful insight on how to deal with these two conflicts. The debate on righteousness and profit focuses on seeking a principle for the predicament of interest conflicts by regulating people's pursuit of interests. Confucianism adopts autonomous morality. This proposition is suitable to solve conflicts of intragroup interests. Different groups hold different moral values and therefore autonomous morality that can resolve intragroup conflict, contrarily, deepens the intergroup conflict. Mohism adopts utilitarianism, trying to expand the application scope of moral principles from the utilitarian calculation. Utilitarianism can be used to solve intergroup conflicts.

KEYWORDS

intragroup conflict; intergroup conflict; autonomous morality; utilitarianism; the debate on righteousness and profit

1 Introduction

Hardin(1968) proposed the parable of The Tragedy of the Commons: "After the herds reach the maximum bearing capacity of a common pasture, the herders will receive a substantial benefit by raising an extra animal, but the pasture will be degraded, and the cost of degradation will be shared by all who use the commons." Greene (2013) borrows this parable to propose a parable of the New Pastures: "A forest fire creates a large new pastures, and the nearby tribes rushed in to claim the land. The tribes of the new pastures have different cultural formation and they have incompatible visions of what a moral society should be". This situation is called the Tragedy of Commonsense Morality.

The Tragedy of the Commons is a kind of intragroup conflict, which illustrates the moral problems of "me" versus "us": selfishness versus concern for others, while the Tragedy of Commonsense Morality is a kind of intergroup conflict, which illustrates the moral problems of "us" versus "them": our interests versus theirs. Intragroup conflict is a tragedy of selfishness, a failure of individuals to put collective interests ahead of their interests. Morality is nature's solution to this problem. From an evolutionary perspective, morality solves the conflict between individual and collective interests by promoting cooperation. Kin Selection demonstrates that cooperation could evolve with blood relationships in natural selection(Hamilton, 1964). Expanding the scope of cooperation beyond the blood relationships, Direct Reciprocity, under the premise of frequent and repeated interaction and exchange, happens when individuals sacrifice their immediate interests to achieve cooperation for long-term interests (Trivers, 1971). It is based on the Direct Reciprocity Theory that the Indirect Reciprocity Theory is built up, by incorporating the perspective of a reputation as a condition for cooperation, without the previous condition of frequent and repeated interaction (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998).

To a certain degree, morality evolved as a device for successful intergroup competition. Spatial Selection Theory believes that individuals will congregate and form different small communities depending on the frequencies of their contacts. Thus, collaborators can form mutually-beneficial networks. Thereby enhancing their competitiveness and evolving with natural selection(Santos & Pacheco, 2011). The basis on Spatial Selection Theory, the Multilevel Selection Theory states that there is cooperation among individuals within one group, which is conducive to winning the intergroup competition(Bowles, 2006, 2009; Bowles & Gintis, 2013). Hence, the very same moral thinking that enables cooperation within groups undermines cooperation between groups. In modern society, individuals often face the dilemma between intragroup interests and intergroup interests, when it is critical to seek a coping strategy to solve this problem.

The traditional Chinese philosophy "yilizhibian" (The debate on righteousness and profit) provides helpful insight on how to deal with these conflicts. The debate on righteousness and profit focuses on seeking a principle for the predicament of interest conflict by regulating people's pursuit of interests. Confucianism advocates moral laws based on emotions to restrict people's pursuit of self-interest. This proposition is suitable to solve conflicts of intragroup interests, which can be realized by intuitive thinking. By contrast, Mohism advocates the restriction of people's pursuit of self-interest with utilitarianism. Utilitarianism can be used to solve intergroup conflicts, the realization of which requires

people's logical thinking and reasoning.

2 Autonomous Morality Coping with In-group Conflicts

As Hume said: "there is none towards whom nature seems, at first sight, to have exercise more cruelty than towards man, in the numberless wants and necessities, with which she has loaded him, and in the slender means, which she affords to the relieving these necessities.", "in man alone, this unnatural conjunction of infirmity, and of necessity, may be observed in its greatest perfection" (Hume, 2012). It shows that the desire for material benefits gives people the power of behavior. However, due to the limited ability of individuals, only by relying on society can they supply for personal defects. The first and original principle of human society was the units of natural appetite between the sexes. Since then, a new type takes place in their concern for their common offspring. This new concern becomes also a principle of union between the parents and offspring and forms a more numerous society maintained by emotions (Hume, 2012). When humans feel that living in groups have become sensible of the infinite advantages that result from it, and note that the chaos of fighting arises from selfishness. Group members will regulate their behavior by making the convention. This kind of emotional-based convention that began with kinship gradually evolved into a moral principle.

Confucian thought of virtue embodies the emotional connection in morality. Confucian values of virtue in terms of humanity. "benevolence" expresses the feelings of loving a person, starting from the love of relatives, but "benevolence" goes beyond loving relatives. As Mencius said,

In regard to inferior creatures, the superior man is kind to them, but not loving. In regard to people generally, he loving them, but not affectionate. He is affectionate to his parents, and lovingly disposed to people generally, and kind to creatures (Mencius-Jin Xin I) (Legge, 2018).

It shows that benevolence embraces all in their love, but the principle of embracing love is kindred first, which starts from the original kinship and takes emotion as the connection of the relationship. Thus it can be seen that Confucian moral thought is based on emotion.

The pursuit of material interests is a powerful driving force for human behavior. However, the limited amount of material resources often leads to conflicts between individual interests and collective interests, which is the so-called tragedy of the Commons. People in the pre-qin period have seen that people always want to monopolize benefits and the harm that comes from it:

Profit belongs to nature. If people want to monopolize it, it will bring a lot of harm (Guoyu-Zhouyu I).

Thus proposed:

Righteousness is the basis for the pursuit of profit. Only by taking righteousness as the foundation can it make the people get rich benefits (Guoyu-Jinyu I).

Confucianism debate on righteousness and profit embodies the idea of regulating people's pursuit of interests with autonomous morality. Confucius for the first time used righteousness and profit as the standard to distinguish the Jun-zi (a man of noble character) from the Xiao-ren (the villain). The Master said,

Jun-zi is conversant with righteousness; the mind of Xiao-ren is conversant with gain (Lunyu-Liren).

It can be seen from the thoughts of Confucius that righteousness and profit are opposite, and he holds the attitude of valuing righteousness outweighing the profit. Mencius said:

Ministers will serve their sovereign for the profit of which they cherish the thought; sons will serve their fathers, and younger brothers will serve their elder brothers, from the same consideration-and the issue will be, that, abandoning benevolence and righteousness, sovereign and minister, father and son, younger brother and elder, will carry on all their breasts. But never has there been such a state of society, without ruin being the result of it...Ministers will serve their sovereign, cherishing the principles of benevolence and righteousness; sons will serve their fathers, and younger brothers will serve their elder brothers, in the same way, and so, sovereign and minister, father and son, elder brother and younger, abandoning the thought of profit, will cherish the principles of benevolence and righteousness, and carry on all their intercourse upon them. But never has there been such a state of society, without the State where it prevailed rising to the royal way. Why must you use that word 'profit'? (Mencius-Gaozi II) (Legge, 2018).

On the issue of which comes first, righteousness or profit? Mencius believes that righteousness has value independent of profit, and righteousness is the prerequisite for people to pursue profit. The Mencius said,

There is a nobility of Heaven, and there is a nobility of man. Benevolence, righteousness, self-consecration, and fidelity, with unwearied joy in these virtues; -these constitute the nobility of Heaven. To be a gong, a qing, or a da fu; -this constitutes the nobility of man. The man of antiquity cultivated their nobility of Heaven, and the nobility of man came to them in its train. The men of the present-day cultivated their nobility of Heaven to seek for the nobility of man, and when they have obtained that, they throw away the other: -their delusion is extreme. The issue is simply this, that they must lose that nobility of man as well (Mencius-Gaozi I) (Legge, 2018).

"A nobility of Heaven" here expresses an absolute and unconditional moral value, while "nobility of man" refers to the political power in reality and expresses the meaning of "profit". That is to say, people should pursue profit under the norms of righteousness. The above analysis shows that Confucianism's ethical thoughts of "The debate on righteousness

and profit” reflect a kind of autonomous morality with emotion as the core (Li, 1990).

Empathy, family love, gratitude, loyalty, tribalism, self-awareness: these familiar human traits form the basis of human morality. Human morality is internalized in people’s thinking, making them automatically make decisions based on moral intuition. Research shows that there is an intuitive system in moral decision-making, which can produce rapid and unconscious automatic processing, and individuals can make value judgments based on this system. The researchers (Evans, Dillon, & Rand, 2014; Rand, Fudenberg, & Dreber, 2015; Rand & Kraft-Todd, 2014; Rand, Krafttodd, & Gruber, 2015) conducted a series of studies using the public goods games to discuss the moral dilemma decision between the individual and the collective. The results showed that the shorter the time the subjects took to make decisions, the more money they put into the “public account”, indicating that the level of cooperation was higher. Moreover, forcing people to decide faster made them more cooperative and forcing people to slow down made them less cooperative. These studies also found that reflecting on the advantages of intuitive thinking made people more cooperative. Likewise, reflecting on the advantages of careful reasoning made people less cooperative. According to this, Rand believes that intuition is biased toward altruism in social dilemmas. Rand’s views are supported by evidence from follow-up researchers who found that time stress, cognitive load, and intuitive processing initiation can enhance individual altruistic behavior (Cone, & Rand, 2014; Rand, Newman, & Wurzbacher, 2014; Fischbacher, Thöni, & Utikal, 2014; Lotz, 2015; Schulz). These studies underscore the point: built into our moral thinking are automated psychological programs that facilitate cooperation. Moral thinking enables people to deal with intragroup conflicts quickly and efficiently.

In modern society, people’s communication space is expanded and they share their living space with various groups in the world, which inevitably leads to inter-group conflicts. Can morality still play an effective normative role in intergroup conflicts?

3 Autonomous Morality Fails to Cope with Intergroup Conflict

Human beings have selfish impulses, but humans have developed moral mechanisms to regulate these impulses. Autonomous morality enables individuals to put collective interests ahead of their interests. The tragedy of Commonsense Morality describes the conflicts between groups, and the autonomous morality has no way to deal with intergroup conflict. One of the reasons is that people prefer in-group to out-group. The Implicit Association Test reveals that people tend to associate their own people with positive concepts and foreigners with negative ones (Dunham et al., 2006). Even when temporary groups are divided based on the most arbitrary of criteria, people tend to have a preference for in-group members (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Pettigrew (2001) found that individuals have different attribution styles between in-group and out-group. For members of the in-group, they tended to attribute good behaviors to internal causes and bad behaviors to external causes, but for members of the out-group, they tended to adopt opposite attribution styles. Cikara et al. (2010) show that when individuals make moral dilemma judgments, they have stereotypes about different groups. Individuals believe that in-group is more capable and higher affinity than out-group. In moral dilemmas, individuals are more accepting of sacrificing members of the out-group.

Moral values also vary widely between groups. Shweder (1982) believes that different cultures have different moral scopes. The sociocentric places the needs of groups and institutions first and subordinating the needs of individuals. Selves were interdependent, and no bright-line separated moral rules (preventing harm) from social conventions (regulating behaviors not linked directly to harm). In contrast, individualistic places individuals at the center and makes society a servant of the individual, and many social conventions are not incorporated into moral rules (Haidt, 2012).

There are also significant differences in the sense of fairness held by groups from different cultures. Henrich et al. (2010) used the ultimatum game to study people’s sense of fairness in different cultural backgrounds in dividing up resources, which are reflected in the willingness to cooperate. The results showed that the willingness to cooperate was different among the members with different cultural backgrounds. The Machiguenga of Peru, for example, is less willing to cooperate than western industrialized nations. The Ache of Paraguay and the Lamelara of Indonesia is more willing to cooperate than western industrialized nations. The reason is that people in different regions live different lifestyles and require different levels of cooperation. Nations have typically expressed a biased sense of fairness in dealing with global warming. There is a stark disagreement about what constitutes a fair distribution. Developed nations tend to think that credits based on historical emissions are fair, while less developed nations favor distribution based on population. This scene was called by the philosopher Stephen Gardiner a “perfect moral storm”, which indicates that at least one side’s sense of fairness is biased (Gardiner, 2011; Greene, 2013).

The above research evidence shows that people are born with a tendency to favor members of the in-group, and different groups have different moral concepts. Autonomous morality solves the conflicts within groups, but does nothing to ease or even escalate the inter-group conflicts. So how do people deal with conflicts between groups?

Our brains, like our other organs, evolved to help us spread our genes. In primitive societies, humans usually live in small groups, and the brain evolves an automated moral intuition that regulates individual behavior in groups, balancing

individuals' selfish desires with the group's common interests. Moral intuition is triggered by moral emotions. Individuals in different groups or cultural backgrounds, their moral values are different and the specific factors that trigger moral emotions are also quite different. Therefore, it is difficult to provide a strong guarantee for inter-group conflicts under moral norms alone.

There is a tribalistic thinking mechanism in the human brain that divides relationships between "us" and "them" and favors "us" even more, but that doesn't mean it can't be changed. To avoid common-sense moral tragedy, there is a need for an unnatural solution.

4 Utilitarianism Deals with Intergroup Conflicts

The difference in moral values between different groups is one of the causes of intergroup conflict in which moral emotion cannot play a role. Therefore, a reasonable way to solve the intergroup conflict is to put our divisive tribal feelings aside and turn to reason thinking to choose behaviors that produce the best overall results. The debate between Confucianism and Mohism in the pre-Qin period on the righteousness and profit provided useful enlightenment. Confucianism advocates autonomous morality to regulate people's pursuit of interests. The criterion is whether the intention and means of the action are moral. Autonomous morality is effective in dealing with conflicts of interest within groups. Mohism advocates the principle of utilitarianism to regulate people's pursuit of interests. The criterion is whether produces the best overall results. Does Mohism's ethical proposition apply to the conflict of interest among intergroup? To answer this question, we need to compare the starting point of Mohism's ethical proposition with the intergroup situation.

Different from the Confucian family-based perspective on virtue and righteousness, Mohism discussed morality from the perspective of social standards and emphasized that everyone loves universally. Confucianism emphasizes family affection and advocates hierarchical love, while Mohism advocates universal love and believes that people should love each other regardless of grade. Universal love contains the principle of reciprocity, Mozi said,

Whoever loves others will be loved by others; whoever assists others will be assisted by others; whoever hates others will be hated by others; whoever injures others will be injured by others. (Mozi-Universal Love II)(Lee, 2009)

The idea of universal love gets rid of the limitation of emotional dependence on nature and expands the applicable situation to the inter-group. Therefore, universal love agrees with the intergroup situation. Universal love is achieved through utilitarian principles. Mozi emphasized that what is good for others is good for oneself. Therefore, universal love and reciprocity can achieve great profits. As Mozi said,

The benevolent always take it as their duty to promote the welfare of the world and to eliminate its calamities. (Mozi-Universal Love III)(Lee, 2009).

Mozi said,

Righteousness is to benefit others. (Mozi-The Cannons I).

The standard of morality is the interest of the greatest number of people. Any behavior that is favorable to the majority of people is just, and vice versa. Mozi spoke of morality in utility, he said,

Righteousness: In intent, he considers the whole world; inability, he is able to benefit others. He does not have to apply for it necessarily. (Mozi-The Cannons I)(Lee, 2009)

In mozi's view, morality is the means to benefit the world, and the interests of the general public should be the standard of behavioral norms. Therefore, the essence of Mohism is based on the principle of utilitarianism, taking the best interests of the majority of people as the behavior norms. Can utilitarianism overcome the limitation that autonomous morality only applies to deal with intra-group conflicts and expand the scope of application to solve inter-group conflicts? The answer to this question needs to be found in the way of moral thinking work.

We face two fundamentally different kinds of moral conflicts, but we also have two fundamentally different kinds of moral thinking. Moral intuition produces fast, unconscious automated processes that play a role in resolving conflicts within groups, a model that is efficient but inflexible. The superior cognitive control unique to humans allows us to do more than just follow this set of moral mechanisms mechanically. The brain also has a kind of manual mode that allows us to get rid of the limitations of moral intuition and make more flexible decisions. Reasoning system makes decisions through meaningful and explicit reasoning processing, which is flexible but relatively inefficient, but once it happens, it can dominate and change the judgment made by the intuitive system. Reasoning processing provides the possibility of solving intergroup moral conflicts by using utilitarian principles.

To sum up, after realizing the moral conflicts faced by human beings and the moral thinking they possess, the key is to match the right kind of thinking to the right kind of problem: When it's Me versus Us, a reasonable solution can often be obtained according to moral intuition. When it's Us versus Them, think carefully before making decisions, and utilitarianism is a suitable solution.

5 Conclusion

In modern society, there are situations in which intragroup conflict and intergroup conflict are intertwined. It is of great significance to seek an effective coping strategy. Intragroup conflict has existed since ancient times, and human beings have evolved autonomous morality to cope with them. However, since the moral values of different groups are different, autonomous morality does not help solve intergroup conflicts, and even deepens them. Therefore, it is necessary to seek a broader range of moral principles to deal with intergroup conflicts. The debate between Confucianism and Mohism on righteousness and profit provides useful enlightenment. The purpose of both theories is to restrain people's selfish desires. Confucianism adopts autonomous morality, which is consistent with the way people use moral intuition to solve intragroup conflict. Mohism adopts utilitarianism, trying to expand the application scope of moral principles from the cognitive level of utilitarian calculation. Utilitarianism is expected to play a role in solving intergroup conflicts, and the reasoning ability of the brain provides physiological feasibility for the application of this principle.

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